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The Decision to Withhold Resuscitation 
in Australia: Problems, Hospital Policy 
and Legal Uncertainty 
Decisions to withhold cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should 
provide explicit clinical and ethical justification, be stated in an IAN H KERRIDGE 
unambiguous manner, and be formally documented in the medical BA, B Med (Hons), M Phil 
chart. Even so, the legal status of decisions to withhold CPR remains clinical Lecturer, Health Law and 
uncertain, in part because there is all too often no written justification Ethics Programme, Faculty of 
for a No-CPR order; no statement of the overall management plan Medicine, University of Newcastle 
subsequent to an order; no indication of who made the decision; no KFNNETH R 
explanation as to what may lead to changes in the decision; and no MITCHELL 
reference to the wishes of the patient, family or surrogate. The fact
 £ . p h D 
that hospital policies regarding No-CPR orders are rare or are ignored
 G r a d Dj R e l ¿t> pAPsS 
may be symptomatic of failures in communication between physicians
 &f | /o r Lecturer Hea]th Law and 
on the one hand and the patient and the health care team on the other.
 Ethics Programme, Faculty of 
Communication failures often mask paternalism and concepts such as Medicine, University of Newcastle 
'futility" and "medical indications" are used to override patient
 a nd 
autonomy in decisions regarding cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. In CATHERINE MYSER 
Newcastle, Australia, a recent review of current CPR practice and its ._ 
ethical implications led to the formulation of policy guidelines 
concerning the problems of when to initiate CPR and when and how Ρ°*'ά&αφ\ά^ 
No-CPR orders should be issued. Center for Biomedical Ethics, United 
States of America 
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Following the invention of closed-chest cardiac massage in I960,1 
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was originally applied to 
victims of cardiorespiratory arrest following acute myocardial l w J? Kouwenhaven, JR Jude 
. * ,. ,. . ^. . , χ - , u ι J and G G Knickerbocker, "Closed-infarction, surgery, cardiac arrhythmias, electrical shock, drowning,
 c h e s t C a r d j a c Massage" (i960) 173 
drug overdose and anaesthetic accidents. Since then, however, it has Journal of the American Medical 
been applied much more widely in the clinical setting and is commonly Association 1064. 
carried out on almost any patient who suffers a cardiorespiratory
 p u l J n a J R ^ (199? 317 
arrest.2 Can such wide application still be ethically justified in the New England Journal of Medicine 
hospital context? The clinical reality is that while 30 to 50 per cent 1075. 
survive the initial resuscitation, only 5 to 23 per cent (an average of « J * ^ ΐ 
13 per cent) survive to hospital discharge.3 Further analysis reveals a Futile?" (1991) 44 AFT 2130. 
consistent clinical dichotomy: patients with chronic, debilitating 4 D J Murphy, "Do-not-resus-
illness rarely survive to hospital discharge (0 to 4 per cent) after fS^S^ÜSS^SA 
CPR,4 whereas otherwise-well patients who experience an acute
 260 Journal of the American Medical 
coronary event have a much greater chance (12 to 40 per cent) of Association 2098. 
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surviving to discharge. Indeed, it is clear that clinical outcome after κ E R RID G E , 
CPR is strongly correlated with underlying illness and that patients M I T C H E L L and M Y S E R 
with certain conditions rarely survive.5 Several studies have 
demonstrated that age alone may not be a determinant of survival 
after CPR,6 although this remains uncertain as there is some 
evidence to suggest that age greater than 70 years may be a prognostic 
indicator.7 Furthermore, aside from potential benefits, CPR, as with 
any other form of medical intervention, has considerable potential 
burdens such as rib fractures, multiple venepunctures, prolonged 
intensive care unit admission and the persistent vegetative state, 
estimated in some studies to be 2.7 per cent.8 
The omission of CPR 
Concern that the initiation of CPR may not be medically or 
ethically justifiable in certain situations and that decisions regarding 
the application or the withholding of CPR are often made without 
justification and/or patient and family input, have led to the 
development of guidelines regarding the omission of CPR. These have 
been variously recorded as DNR (Do Not Resuscitate), NFR (Not for 
Resuscitation), GPC (Good Palliative Care), and No-CPR orders. 
The development of institutional guidelines does not in itself 
guarantee that existing legal and ethical difficulties will be resolved. 
5
 J La Puma, M Silverstein, 
Problems With documentation C Stocking, D Roland and M Siegler, 
"Life-sustaining Treatment: A 
In a recent study carried out in Australia, analysis of DNR orders 5 S S A K Ì S A S ? 
m one hospital over a three-month period revealed that 84 per cent
 (1988^ 148 archives ,·„ internal 
were not documented in accordance with the wording recommended Medicine 148. 
in its hospital policy.9 This is an important finding as proper 6RM Keating, "Exclusion from 
understanding or interpretation of a No-CPR order is difficult, if not Resuscitation" 0*89) 82 Journal of 
impossible, without a clear and unambiguous statement of the 'A%*^7 *£** " ^ S i o n in 
No-CPR order and the rationale behind it. However, there is often no
 thc Elderly: A Blessing or a Curse?" 
written justification for orders to omit resuscitation.10 Indeed, a (1989) in Archives in internal 
recent English survey showed that only a quarter of the patients Medicine 193. 
determined as unsuitable for CPR had No-CPR orders written in their * J p. 5?^;, 1 ^ f J n ! H τ Jj-X- xi_ ι χ u x r x Davis and E L Nagel, "Complications 
notes.11 In addition, there was no explanation as to what factors
 o f Car(üac Resuscitation" (1987) 92 
might change the decision, no reference to the wishes of the patient, chest 287. 
family or surrogate, and/or no statement of the overall management · D P Stanley and D P Reid, 
plan subsequent to the order.12 By any standard, No-CPR notation "Withholding Cardio-pulmonary 
is often cursory, ambiguous and frequently neglected altogether. This f^11^11' Me^Journdof 
seems particularly to be the case in large teaching hospitals, where the Australia 257. 
risk of misinterpretation increases exponentially with the number of «· κ Stewart, K Abel and G S Rai, 
health care professionals involved in primary care. "Resuscitation Decisions in a General 
Hospital" (1990) 300 British Medical 
Journal 785. 
Problems involving patients and families in resuscitation . . ^ J ™ , · * ? J J S S 
decisions Orders in a District General Hospital" 
(1991) 303 British Medical Journal 
Ethically and legally, the fact that medical opinion judges a 1504. 
competent patient's refusal as "unreasonable" does not lessen or *^  H L Lipton, -i>o-not.r^ uscitate 
xu x- x» · ux χ ι U J - - w χ xu- - χ A Decisions in a Community Hospital: 
remove the patient's right to make such a decision. Most ethicists and
 I n c i d c n c e > implications and 
physicians agree that respect for the patient's capacity to make a outcomes" (1986) 256 Journal of the 
competent and autonomous choice should be a primary factor in American Medical Association 1164. 
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decisions which determine that patient's resuscitation status.13 Yet The Decision to Withhold 
when it comes to actually making the decision, the patient—the person Resuscitation in Australia: 
whose life is most affected—is seldom involved in the end-of-life Problems, Η ο ^ ^ J 0 ^ - ? 
decision to resuscitate or not resuscitate.,4 Why is this so, given that Îf5î—ncertam y 
it is a violation of the patient's right and exposes the physician to 
potential legal problems?15 ° Ei*^wey, "involvingPatients 
v e K
 in Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) 
Decisions: An Old Issue Raising its 
Ugly Head" (1991) 17 Journal of 
Paternalism Medical Ethics 156. 
14
 Keating, op cit η 6; D A 
One reason may be paternalism. In its most ethically acceptable Schwartz and P Reilly, «The Choice 
c ^ x - ' i x x x xu χ- χ r U U i - Not to be Resuscitated" (1986) 34 
form, the physician seeks to protect the patient from harm by making
 Joumal of the American Medica/ 
decisions for the patient. In the case of CPR or No-CPR decisions, Geriatric Society 807. 
it is argued that patients would rather not know that they are dying 15 L Doyal and D Wilsher, "With-
or, if aware of it, would prefer not to discuss it with others.16 The holding Cardio-pulmonary Resus-
belief that patients would rather avoid such discussions and be G^ e^Hnes' »Ι>Γ°?ί^ «> 306 BrUbh 
shielded from the implications of their disease process is a Medical Journal 1593. 
questionable one at best, considering the survey data now « S G Schade and H Muslin, "Do-
available.17 Secondly, the physician may believe that the clinical not-resuscitate Decisions: Discussion 
factors affecting decisions regarding critical life-and-death choices are ^ ^ ^ S t e ' i i l 9 8 ^ 1 5 1^*** 
too complex for patients to understand and deal with.18 However, 0^17 Keating/op cit η 6; C J Stolman, 
for the most part competent patients are well able to make a No-CPR j j Gregory, D Dunn and J L Levine! 
decision when given the relevant information, but are often bypassed "Evaluation of Patient, Physician, 
in favour of using their family as decision-makers, because some Nurse and Family Attitudes Toward 
studies have shown some patients as incapable of coping with bad ^ Z*7^%M™* 
news.
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 In any case, neither physicians nor family members are very
 u
 D Orentlicher, "The illusion of 
good at predicting patients' preferences for or against Patient Choice in End-of-life 
resusc i tat ion. 2 0 Decisions" (1992) 267 Journal of the 
American Medical Association 2101. 
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 L V Torian, E J Davidson, 
ΓΏΏ /c «fútil»» H M F i U i t ' F G u l 0 p a n d L L S e l 1 ' 
Lx/Ά lo jume ««Decisions For and Against 
Resuscitation in an Acute Geriatric 
In contrast to the above, it has been argued that a physician has no Medicine Unit Serving the Frail 
obligation to discuss CPR with a patient, even if competent, where its f lderly,;,^1?92) ^ 1
2 Archives of 
T , · j j
 A u J- il c x-i τι TM. χ Internal Medicine 561. use has been judged to be medically futile.21 The argument assumes J0 RFuhlmann, R APearlmanand 
that the judgment that CPR is futile for a particular patient can κ C Cain, "Physicians' and Spouses' 
always be determined on objective grounds. If CPR is judged futile, Predictions of Elderly Patients' 
some argue, then it justifies a No-CPR order. They furthermore argue Resuscitation Preferences" (1988) 43 
that such futility justifies the writing of such an order without the JT^^^S!T^i^ and 
consent of either patient or family. However, in many cases, the wilsher, op cit η 15. 
determination that CPR is futile is not an objective process but rather 22 R D Truog, "Beyond Futility, 
relativistic and probability based,22 and is influenced by the Commentary on B S Carter and 
physician's values* and assumptions related to anticipated specific J?*i\dlin*'s ^ ^ " " ^ J I Ä 
Γ
 r
.A . - i x j - u ->A τ xu xu NICU: The Question of Medical 
benefits such as survival to discharge.24 In these cases, the
 Fut i l i ty» {l992) 3 Journal of Clinic 
physician's values dominate the risk-benefit calculations as to what is Ethics 142. 
worthwhile and tolerable for the patient. In such a case, the extra days M E M Wächter, J M Luce, 
of life gained from CPR are seen as insufficient and the use of CPR N Hearst and B Lo· "Decisions about 
as ineffective and futile.- The issue, however, is not whether the ^ ^ ^TSsJZZ 
physicians value judgment should be considered, or should
 similarprognoses"(1989) 111 Annals 
predominate, but that the physician's values should not be the sole of internal Medicine 525. 
basis for determining CPR as "useful" or "futile" in all end-of-life u Von Gunten, op cit η 3. 
decisions. We recognise that there may come a time when "reasonable
 β
 * J ^ ^ t h e ™ 1 Eüiicf^of 
probability" suggests that there is an extremely low chance of survival Resuscitation" (1990*264 Journal of 
and thus it may be reasonable not to administer CPR. Furthermore, the American Medical Association 
there may be cases where the burdens of CPR for the patient are 1276. 
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judged to far outweigh its benefits. At any rate, a central issue is the K E R RI D G E , 
extent to which the decision to withhold CPR should be based on a M I T C H E L L and M Y S E R 
shared perception or understanding of what counts as a "reasonable 
benefit worth pursuing" through CPR.26 
Resolving problems through shared decision-making 
A competent and well-informed patient, family or surrogate is well 
able to choose between the option of CPR or No-CPR. The major 
problem that can arise—choosing CPR when quantitatively futile— 
can for the most part be avoided by adequate interactional skills and 
sufficient disclosure of information, and resolved through caring and 
compassionate counselling.27 Most competent patients, for example, 
are aware of their own imminent death, and though the physician may 
be under no obligation to obtain permission to withhold CPR in such 
a case, there remains a moral duty to explain the limitations of 
medicine and why health care professionals may be reluctant to accede 
to patients' requests for CPR. "Futility" may not be as precise a 
concept as we would like, but despite its limitations it can be a starting 
point for discussing the chances of success following CPR 
(quantitative), and the patient's values and preferences regarding 
quality-of-life issues (qualitative). Despite the strong argument and 
prima facie obligation in favour of respecting the patient's autonomy, 
time spent appraising the weight of this obligation—vis-à-vis the 
patient's role in decision-making in the face of undefined statements 
of futility regarding the use of CPR—would be more constructive if 
spent informing the patient and ensuring that both the physician and 
the patient accept the limits of what medicine can do and the 
inevitability of death. The offer of good palliative care with attention 
to the control of discomforts which the patient may experience, is a 
positive step that can be taken and is an appropriate alternative to 
aggressive action aimed at the maintenance of life at all costs through 
the inappropriate use of CPR. The notion of "futility", with all its 
imprecision, may still be used as a starting point for discussion and 
for continued collaborative decision-making with the patient, family 
and other members of the patient's health care team.28 Because 
No-CPR orders can be a potent source of misunderstanding, and even 
anger and distress among health care workers, any decision for or 
against CPR should also be discussed with key health team members. 
Although ultimate responsibility rests with the primary physician, the 
involvement of appropriate members of the health care team in the 
decision-making process may ensure a more coherent management 
plan. Excluding health care team members from the decision-making 
process may generate unnecessary tensions which affect both the 
quality of decisions and staff morale. 
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· « J . A ^ •· 1 6 N S Jecker, "Medical Futility: 
Legal uncertainty and "No-CPR" orders in Australia
 w h o D e c i d e s ? " (1992) 152 Archives 
of Internal Medicine 1140. 
Some uncertainty still exists regarding the legal status of decisions 27 Lowey, op cit η 13. 
to withhold and withdraw medical treatment in Australia, despite the „Missin^lhf ap
n
0
d
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K
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fact that several States (South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and the
 wb]J2J|J· andC the°Ethical Ideal of 
Northern Territory) have enacted "natural death" legislation that informed and Shared Decision-
defines the competent adult's right to refuse life-prolonging making" (1994) 1(4) JLM 239. 
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treatment. In New South Wales, the position of the Crown Solicitor The Decision to Withhold 
is that Resuscitation in Australia: 
Problems, Hospital Policy and 
"where life-saving treatment is withheld or withdrawn from a Legal Uncertainty 
patient, serious issues of criminal responsibility (including 
negligence, manslaughter and murder) will arise on the part of 
individuals involved in the care and treatment of patients".29 
Since this opinion, recent developments in case law, both in Australia 
and the United Kingdom, have helped to clarify the medico-legal 
obligation owed to the patient. In the interim, the widespread use of 
No-CPR orders appears to proceed on the assumption that the law 
recognises, albeit sub silentio,30 that a No-CPR order is appropriate 
where it conforms to the wishes of the patient or surrogate and where, 
if provided, CPR would offer no benefit to the patient and would 
merely prolong the dying process. It has been suggested that a failure
 29 Proposed Legislaüon t0 Give 
to initiate CPR may amount to a criminal act because the decision
 Legai £jject t0 Directions Against 
could lead to the patient's death. However, there are many Artificial Prolongation of the Dying 
uncertainties about the application of the criminal law in this context. Process, Discussion Paper (Legal 
These include (i) whether the cause of death is the underlying illness ?frvices Bran,ch· ^ w South Wales 
xu J · · x x - X - X ^T*r» /-ν \- ^  *x- ¿ ixu Department of Health, 1990). 
or the decision not to initiate CPR; (n) whether the health care 30 τ A Torda and P Gerber, "To 
workers had a duty of care to initiate CPR; and (iii) whether the Resuscitate or Not, That is the 
criminal law applies when the decision made is not intended to kill, Question" (1989) 151 Medical Journal 
but simply to relieve the suffering of the patient. The legal position of Australia 91. 
is less clear in the case of incompetent patients. However, the law has n ^ f ^ W L R 316 aCtn 3*86; 
recognised that there may be cases where the patient's quality of life j Freckelton, "Withdrawal of Life 
is SO poor that it is appropriate to withhold or withdraw life-SUStaining Support: The Persistent Vegetative 
t reatment. 3 1 State Conundrum" (1993) 1(1) JLM 
35 at 42; D Mendelson, 
In contrast to the position in the United States, which has had "Jurisprudential Aspects of 
institutional policies for DNR orders since 1974,32 and Britain, where Withdrawal of Life Support Systems 
CPR policies are now a topic for debate and specific lZralV^iM) 69^AU 
recommendations,33 very little debate has taken place in Australia (forthcoming), 
and New Zealand and almost no attempt has been made by 32 M τ Rabkin, G Gillerman and 
legislatures to clarify the specific legal issues raised by CPR orders. N R Rice» 'Orders Not to 
Resuscitate" (1976) 295 New England 
Journal of Medicine 364. 
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Hospita l policy and " N o - C P R " guidelines T H Dent and J H Gillard, "Cardio­
pulmonary Resuscitation: Effective-
Existing institutional policies have failed to demonstrate a change n,ess· ^ w and ^ W a T (W3) 27 
,- - ,
 4. A rA. . A. xu- 1 J i 1 Journal of the Royal College of 
in clinical practice. As a consequence of the persisting ethical and legal physicians of London 354 (editorial); 
uncertainty regarding resuscitation, the Clinical Ethics Committee of R Williams, "The 4Do Not Resus-
the John Hunter Hospital recently developed general guidelines for citate* Decision: Guidelines for Policy 
the omission of CPR, that is, No-CPR orders.34 The term No-CPR ΐ ^ * * * " <1993>,21¿?urnaloJthef 
was chosen in preference to either DNR, NFR or GPC specifically J S Ì i , 13?D Florin " O ^ No"t 
because it refers to the only intervention being considered for Resuscitate* Orders: The Need for a 
withholding, that is, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, and because it Policy" (1993) 27 Journal of the 
avoids confusion about the meaning of "resuscitation" and the *oyai College of Physicians of 
i m p l i c a ^ E 2 J J £ SÎeof i ïuÎut 
specifically address the question of whether to initiate CPR when the
 in association with the Resuscitation 
patient has a cardio-pulmonary arrest, and the use of No-CPR orders Council (UK), Decisions Relating to 
to avoid initiating C P R consistent with appropriate clinical, ethical Cardio-pulmonary Resuscitation 
and legal standards and safeguards. It must be noted, however, that ( B ^ A , London, 1 9 1 3 ) M 
policies by themselves fail, and will continue to fail until they receive
 Mitchdl ^ „ ' a m b l m , «'Guidelines 
institutional support at all levels and are embedded within integrated for *NO-CPR' Order" (1994) Medical 
and coherent educational programmes. Journal of Australia (in press). 
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K E R R I D G E , 
(1) A No-CPR order should always involve appropriate members of M I T C H E L L and M Y S E R 
the health care team (for example, nurses, allied health 
professionals, medical staff) in the decision-making, although the 
final decision remains the responsibility of the senior attending 
medical officer. 
(2) A No-CPR order should be recorded as a formal order in the 
patient's progress notes in a clear and unambiguous manner. 
(3) A No-CPR order should incorporate a brief description of 
discussions with the patient and/or family members, and 
(a) a statement of the patient's wishes (when the patient is 
competent) or 
(b) the role of the family/surrogate (when the patient is 
incompetent). 
(4) Where a decision has been made not to involve a patient or 
surrogate in decisions regarding resuscitation status, an 
explanation should be provided in the progress notes as to the 
rationale underlying this decision. 
(5) Any No-CPR order should include a statement of the medical 
condition to justify a No-CPR order. 
(6) Any No-CPR order should include a statement about the scope of 
the order specifying the management plan (curative and/or 
palliative) subsequent to the No-CPR order. 
(7) Any No-CPR order should be subject to review on a regular basis 
and can be rescinded at any time. Any review should be 
implemented and documented in the patient's progress notes in 
the manner specified above. 
Table 1: Hospital guidelines for No-CPR order 
Conclusion 
A recent commentator observed, when commenting on the decision-
making relationship between patient autonomy, futility and who 
should receive CPR: 
"CPR is not a harmless technological placebo. CPR may harm 
the subject, relatives, health-care staff, and society. Each of these 
four parties has an interest."35 
Not surprisingly the ethical issues associated with No-CPR remain 
complex and invite both community and judicial scrutiny in Australia. 
Furthermore, No-CPR decisions have important and unavoidable 
implications for hospital resources. The decision to record No-CPR 
on a patient's chart represents a crucial therapeutic point in the care 
of the critically ill and should be reached only after reflective and 
sympathetic discussion with the patient where they so choose, and if
 35 j S a n ( j e r S i ««who's for CPR?" 
they are incompetent to do so, with their family or surrogate and (\992) 26 Journal of the Royal College 
appropriate member(s) of the health care team. of Physicians of London 254. 
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